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Abstract
In default of prior probability the parameter is not defined as a random variable, hence
there can be no genuine prior-free parametric inference. Nevertheless prior-free predic-
tive inference regarding any future data is generated directly from the datum of a location
measurement. Such inference turns out as if obtained from a certain pdf (“fiducial”) in-
directly associated with the parameter. This false pdf can expedite predictive inference,
but is inappropriate in the analysis of combined measurements (unless they all are location
measurements of the same parameter). Also it has the same distribution as the ostensible
Bayesian posterior from a uniform “prior”. However, if any of these spurious entities is
admitted in the analysis, inconsistent results follow. When we combine measurements, we
find that the quantisation errors, inevitable in data recording, must be taken into consider-
ation. These errors cannot be folded into predictive inference in an exact sense; that is, we
cannot render a predictive distribution of a future datum except as an approximation.
Keywords: location measurement; combination of observations; parametric inference; pre-
dictive inference; prior-free inference; quantisation error; digitisation; frequentist interpre-
tation; pivotal inference; the fiducial argument; fiducial probability; intuitive assessment;
prior-free assessment.
1 Introduction
This work aims at a critical foundation of “pivotal inference”, with a generalisation to combined location
measurements. The issue is not in the application, because the solution is obvious anyway, at least
in form, from direct intuition; the issue is in stating this solution in non-problematic terms, within
the calculus of probabilities, without any supplementary principle. Addressing the general problem of
prior-free parametric inference hinges on our understanding this plain situation.
If in some measurement the error is understood as a random effect influenced only by factors outside
the scope of this measurement, we call it a “location” measurement. For example when we measure the
angular distance of two stars in a clear sky, the probability density function of the error depends on the
properties of the instrument but is regarded as causally independent of either the true angular distance
or of the resulting datum.
If there is prior probability associated with the location parameter we apply Bayes’ Theorem to
generate statistical inference. The present work deals mainly with cases in which there is no prior
probability. If we do not know in what way the two stars in the example have been picked, then we have
such a case.
∗anakreon@hol.gr
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Intuitive interpretation of the result of a location measurement is quite plain. If the error is known
to follow, for example, a normal distribution, intuition says that the information we gain about the
measured parameter is expressed by a normal distribution which has the same variance. Yet against this
plausible claim a formal objection is raised, that either there is prior probability or the parameter is not
a random variable; if the parameter is converted into a random variable in the course of the analysis,
some paradoxical (at least) consequences follow. At any rate, let us call this interpretation “intuitive” or
“prior-free” parametric “assessment” (reserving the term ‘inference’ for procedures defined only within
the calculus of probabilities). It is not distinct from so-called pivotal inference or the fiducial argument.
Related theoretical discussions often involve such terms that do not provide a clear correspondence
to an experimentalist’s intuition. Moreover the logical standing of these probability distributions has
been challenged with regard to certain paradoxes. To avoid logical inconsistency this work begins
with a careful analysis of the location measurement, without any direct reference to specific statistical
foundations, like objective Bayesian, fiducial, structural, or pivotal.
However, with the kind of measurements considered here, we shall encounter no difficulty in de-
riving predictive inference regarding any future datum that is related to the same parameter, without
resorting to parametric inference. That is, knowing the datum x1 of the location measurement and the
model PrX(x|θ) of any future measurement, we obtain directly PrX(x|x1). Then it turns out that intuition
is vindicated somehow, because predictive inference seems as if generated from the density function of
intuitive assessment. Yet the latter is only a useful formula, not genuine probability pertaining to the
measured parameter. In particular this supposed pdf is not meant to be the prior in a Bayesian analysis of
the second measurement – this and related issues will occupy us in Sec. 2.1.5 – though such presumption
is harmless when we combine location measurements of the same parameter. Let us leave for another
work the question whether predictive inference can in general be formulated as if from coherent para-
metric inference, that is, even when it is based neither on a location measurement nor on combination
of location measurements of the same parameter.
If one assumes an unnormalised uniform density as prior probability for the parameter (that is, an
unwarranted and possibly improper flat “prior”) the related posterior pdf coincides with the supposed pdf
of intuitive assessment. Moreover a remarkable multitude of proposed statistical foundations provide
the same result to the problem of location measurement (regarding those, see [1] and [2]). In contrast to
them the present work does not introduce any special axiom beside the usual postulates of probability.
For that matter, one need not abandon the frequentist interpretation.
2 A single location measurement
2.1 Preliminary analysis
2.1.1 Basic considerations
Definition. If a measurement provides a single datum x for estimating a scalar parameter θ, the terms
‘location parameter’ and ‘location measurement’ mean that, in this parametrization, the measurement
error, e≡ x−θ, is additive noise of known pdf PrE(e|B) = f (e), where ‘B’ stands for the background ev-
idence or assumptions that establish this property. Random variable E is regarded as causally unrelated
to anything else in this model. The symbol θ represents any conceivable value of the parameter, not just
the unknown true value. Each time we simulate the measurement for testing purposes, the parameter θ
is assigned some arbitrary value.
We assume that our first measurement is such a measurement, on the basis of assumptions B1. With
reference to any particular value (real or hypothetical) of the parameter, before the measurement the first
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datum corresponds to a random variable:
PrX1(x1|B1,θ) = PrE1(x1−θ|B1,θ) = f1(x1−θ) . (1)
(Density functions are represented by functions in the stated parametrization.) If the parameter is un-
known, then this pdf is unavailable.
2.1.2 Bayesian inference for the parameter and for the error
It may happen that, independently of the result of the measurement, we also possess some information
H leading to the definition of a random variable Θ corresponding to the parameter, so that PrΘ(θ|H )
= pi(θ). (For example, suppose that the true value of the parameter is a random sample drawn from a
known population.) Then, using that pdf as the prior, Bayes’ Theorem furnishes the posterior pdf of Θ:
PrΘ(θ|H ,B1,x1) ∝ pi(θ) f1(x1−θ) .
From the combination of PrΘ(θ|H ) with Eq. 1, the pre-measurement joint pdf of Θ and X is defined,
pi(θ) f1(x1−θ). The marginal pdf of E1 (≡ X1−Θ) is f1(e1) of course. After the measurement, e1
corresponds to the random variable x1−Θ. Therefore the pdf of E1 after the measurement is
PrE1(e1|H ,B1,x1) = PrΘ(x1−e1|H ,B1,x1) ∝ pi(x1−e1) f1(e1) . (2)
Note that this updated pdf of E1 can also be viewed as the posterior of an alternate Bayesian esti-
mation, concerning E1 rather than Θ. An instrument maker is primarily interested in the error of this
measurement. Based on trials or on currently accepted theory, he has established a prior pdf PrE1(e1|B1)
= f1(e1) about the error, and is ready to update this pdf (with regard to the particular instance only)
when he obtains datum x1 and prior pi(θ) for Θ. The likelihood of e1 would be PrX1(x1|H ,e1) =
PrΘ(x1−e1|H ,e1) = pi(x1−e1). The resulting posterior for the error would be ∝ pi(x1−e1) f1(e1), the
same as that obtained in Eq. 2. The post-measurement pdf of the error has been obtained in two different
ways to introduce an argument in the following section.
Frequentist interpretation of the posterior probability of the error (or any variable) requires embed-
ding the actual situation in the most general ensemble of imaginary experiments that can be conditioned
by the same particulars. In our case, the conditioning consists of datum x1 in conjunction with prior
information H . Far from being ad hoc, this embedding schema is implicit in common and indispensable
uses of probability. For example, after a coin is tossed but before the outcome is seen, we still associate
a probability 1/2 with ‘head’, though the outcome is no longer random but only unknown. Therefore in
such cases we must allow the use of probability to describe one’s state of knowledge; in particular, to
weigh forecasts about a fixed unknown quantity, if in some sense it has been drawn from an ensemble.
In certain other cases, for example if the unknown quantity is supposed to be a constant of nature, the
notion of probability would be problematic.
2.1.3 What inference is possible in the absence of prior probability
Under the assumption that the parameter is a random variable, Sec. 2.1.2 contains two equivalent ways
of reckoning the posterior probability of the error. Based on the rationale of the second derivation, we
can form the following argument. Suppose that there is no prior probability associated with θ; then the
instrument maker cannot apply Bayes’ Theorem to update his prior for the error; therefore the pdf of E1
after the measurement will remain f1(e1).
The ensemble of imaginary experiments corresponding to a prior-less location measurement in-
volves all possible values of the parameter, though with an indeterminate distribution, because the pa-
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rameter is not a random variable. Without a definite distribution of values for the parameter, conditioning
this ensemble on the datum alone cannot update the pdf of the error.1
Caution must be exercised in interpreting random variable x1−E1, after the measurement. (For that
matter, before the measurement x1 neither is constant nor corresponds to a random variable, except only
in relation to any fixed hypothetical value of the parameter; that is, before the measurement there is
no available definite distribution associated with the datum.) It is tempting to identify x1−E1 with the
parameter itself, since its unknown true value is equal to the unknown true value of the parameter.2 Yet
this premise would lead to paradoxical, at least, conclusions (as in Sec. 2.1.5); it is not adopted here.
The parameter remains an unknown constant only, not converted into a random variable.
Now we come to the problem of predictive inference. In general the second measurement is modeled
as
PrX(x|M ,θ) = p(x;θ) (3)
that is, x|M ,θ corresponds to a random variable.
We can also match x|M ,x1,e1 to a random variable, because each possible value e corresponds to
θ ≡ x1−e1:
PrX(x|M ,x1,e1) = p(x;x1−e1) (4)
so that, in conjunction with the pdf of E1, joint pdf of X and E1 is defined:
PrX ,E1(x,e1|B1,M ,x1) = p(x;x1−e1) f1(e1) . (5)
Predictive inference for X amounts to the marginal pdf of this variable,3
PrX(x|B1,M ,x1) =
∫
de p(x;x1−e1) f1(e1) . (6)
We have obtained prior-free predictive inference about any future measurement directly, thus by-
passing the problem of prior-free parametric inference. Not only the assumption of a pdf for the pa-
rameter is not required, but it would annul this derivation. Of course we depend on the assumption that
there is a single, constant true value of the parameter, otherwise the substitution of θ (in the model of
the second measurement) with x1−e1 would not be justified.
The parameter itself is not a random variable, yet there is a remarkable coincidence. If we only
pretend that in the future measurement the parameter is a random variable with the same pdf as x1−E1
the resulting predictive inference for X will turn out the same as in Eq. 6. Therefore there is utility in
communicating the pdf of x1−E1, because it happens to generate correct predictive inference. For that
1We can represent the unconditioned ensemble by means of a sequence of actual simulated measure-
ments, each starting with some arbitrary θ i, provided that the distribution of these values is understood
as irrelevant. Then conditioning on the datum alone (not on the presumed true value of the parameter,
which is inaccessible) cannot modify the distribution of the error, which remains f1(e1).
2Before the measurement, the expression x1−E1 is equivalent to θ, but the meaning changes after
the measurement: x1 is restricted to the actual result but E1 is still understood with reference to the
ensemble of all measurements.
3If we take into account that we never know x1 directly except by means of some digital transcript
y1, we shall be interested in conditioning by y1 rather than by x1. This problem is addressed in Sections
2.1.6 and 2.2.
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matter, only in this capacity our intuitive parametric assessment can acquire a proper definition.4
Pr(x1−E1)(θ|B1,x1) = PrE1(x1−θ|B1,x1) = f1(x1−θ). (7)
The same result, in form, has been obtained also by means of applying fiducial, pivotal, structural, or
objective Bayesian “inference”, but in this work we do not consider any kind of inference not based on
the calculus of probabilities exclusively.
The density function of intuitive parametric assessment (that is, the pdf of x1−E1) has been defined
without reference to what the parameter stands for; it represents only whatever the apparatus has mea-
sured. It makes no difference whether the true value of the parameter is understood to be, for example,
a constant of nature or some quasi-constant magnitude (like the radius of a star). The pdf is not of that
magnitude but only related to it, as an accessory of predictive inference. Therefore this pdf is not in
conflict with the frequentist interpretation of probability.
2.1.4 Essential distinctions and caveats
Sometimes the issue of prior-free assessment is confused due to considerations assuming a joint pdf of
Θ and X1. For that matter, it cannot be denied that the existence of some pdf related to the parameter
after the measurement, along with the family of conditional pdfs PrX1(x1|θ), defines some joint pdf; yet
this pdf is not of Θ and X1 but of x1−E1 and X2, where X2 represents the datum of a hypothetical second
iid measurement. Besides, if one assumed a joint pdf of some Θ (defined independently) and X1, then
the Bayesian method would be applicable; the marginal pdf of that Θ would be the prior.
If one assumes a prior uniform in the location parameter (we have not done so) the posterior will be
represented by the same density function as that of prior-free assessment, though the two functions are
different in intent. In this work, if a prior happens to generate the same posterior as the pdf of prior-free
assessment, it will be called the “false prior” of the measurement to emphasise that (like a false ceiling
or false teeth) it has a function (it generates the same result as prior-free assessment) but is not the real
thing.5 In any specific problem, existence of a false prior would simply mean that prior-free prediction
is equivalent to prediction based on that prior (as it happens; not because Bayes’ Theorem applies).
Non-existence of a false prior would imply either that predictive inference cannot be reduced to any
presumptive pdf of the parameter, or a situation in which the ratio of that pdf to the likelihood depends
not only on θ but also on x.
The case of a location measurement without prior probability is so intuitively transparent that it
is inconceivable for any proposed statistical foundation to provide any solution other than a density
function of the same profile as that of Eq. 7, that is, equivalent to the posterior obtained from a uniform
false prior. “Virtually all default Bayesian methods recommend this conditional prior, as do various
“structural” and even frequentist approaches” ([2], Sec. 4.3, referring to a more general case). Therefore,
in the case of a location measurement at least, it seems legitimate for an experimenter to follow plain
intuition and consider the option of no prior. Of course we must examine in what circumstances this
4Fisher has remarked that the problem of fiducial predictive inference based on datum x1 can be
solved “directly”, not only “after the [...] distribution of the population parameter[...] has been obtained”
([3], Sec. II), “without discussing the possible values of the parameter θ” ([4], Sec. V.3). Yet he defines
fiducial prediction only as derived from fiducial probability of the parameter values; consequently the
simplification he mentions is only a secondary issue. In the present work predictive inference is defined
in the absence of any distribution for θ; therefore the possibility to also calculate it as if from some
intuitive density function of the parameter is regarded as fortuitous, proved in the case of location
measurements but not yet guaranteed to be generally true.
5That is, a false prior for θ is not meant to be combined with the parametric family PrX(x|θ) to produce
a joint pdf of Θ and X . The only use of a density that is known to be a false prior is to be multiplied with
the likelihood, PrX(x|θ), in order to calculate the density function of intuitive assessment.
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option is appropriate; on the other hand, we must also assess when prior probability can be asserted on
the basis of educated guessing only. These questions are left for another work.
2.1.5 Can Bayesian estimation be combined with prior-free assessment?
If someone regards the pdf of prior-free assessment as converting the parameter into a random variable,
then in the analysis of a second measurement Bayes’ Theorem would be applicable, with this pdf provid-
ing prior probability. It is not surprising that this consideration leads to inconsistency in the results. For
instance, if we combine two location measurements regarding not the same parameter but two functions
of the same parameter, the posterior pdf depends on the order of analysing the two measurements.
Yet even if we reckon strictly within the limits of predictive inference, the same predicament seems
to arise. When the second datum, x, is obtained, Eq. 4 provides the likelihood of any value e1 of
the error; the likelihood can be combined with the prior pdf, f1(e1), to form the posterior pdf of E1.
If this is correct, then new pdf of x1−E1 will be obtained, which in turn may be used for predictive
inference regarding a third datum, and so on. In effect random variable x1−E1, with updated pdf after
each measurement, would act as a surrogate random variable for the parameter, even after we combine
two or more location measurements. Yet in this way the parameter turns effectively into that random
variable, in spite of the initial assumption. If this concern seems remote from practical applications, let
us consider the combination of two location measurements regarding not the same parameter but two
functions of the same parameter, like the diameter and the volume of a sphere. If we update the pdf of
the error in the way suggested above, then predictive inference concerning any future third measurement
depends on the order of combining the two data (the method is equivalent to admitting the false prior of
the first measurement). Unless we suppose that information may have some metaphysical consequence,
we cannot accept that predictive inference about any third datum may depend on the order of receiving
the first two data. Almost certainly there is some error in the argument, and we must find it (otherwise
this inconsistency would be credited to the common postulates of probability calculus).
2.1.6 Predictive inference is known only as an approximation
A careful review locates the fault in overlooking an approximation attendant to employing Eq. 4. The
“analog” datum x1 is registered as a numerical record y1, using a scale of step P1, so that a quantisation
error r1 (≡ y1−x1), however small, is unavoidable, constrained in the range [−P1/2,P1/2). Therefore
corresponding to any conceivable value e1 (≡ x1−θ) there is no single value θ, but rather some small
range of values.
Nevertheless the pursuit of predictive inference is not impaired thereby, except that we end up with
an approximation of the unknown true density function. Since x1 is strictly speaking inaccessible, Eq. 6
cannot be our goal. We can redefine predictive inference, to be conditioned by y1 and r1 instead of x1:
PrX(x|B1,M ,y1,r1) =
∫
de1 p(x;y1−r1−e1) f1(e1) . (8)
Inasmuch as r1 cannot be known, we have not yet produced exact predictive inference. We would like
to define “PrX(x|B1,M ,y1)” but, as we shall see in Sec. 2.2, we cannot apply any exact meaning to
this expression in the absence of prior probability. Nevertheless for small enough P1 (we are interested
only in the limit of vanishing P1 because in general we want to keep round-off errors so small as to be
insignificant) and assuming smoothness of f1(·) and p(·; ·), the true but unknown PrX(x|B1,M ,y1,r1) is
uniformly approximated by the following density function (the limiting operation assumes an imagined
sequence with P1 going to 0; the corresponding values r1, in [−P1/2,P1/2), are of no consequence in
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defining this limit)
lim PrX(x|B1,M ,y1,r1) =
∫
de1 p(x;y1−e1) f1(e1) , (9)
not dependent on r1. In practice it takes the place of the non-existent “PrX(x|B1,M ,y1)”.6
Yet in view of this complication the troubling Bayesian argument in Sec. 2.1.5 must be replaced
by a more detailed examination, as in the following sections; the perplexing inconsistency that it had
generated disappears, only at the cost of our having to reconsider the method of updating the pdf of e1.
For that matter, we shall see that r1 does not correspond to any exactly defined pdf, therefore there is no
exactly defined updated distribution for e1, unless it is conditioned by the unknown r1.
2.2 Quantisation error in a single location measurement without prior
Even in the plainest measurement, every time a numerical record is kept a quantisation error is gener-
ated, also known as “digitisation” error. We are justified to neglect it in the case of a single location
measurement, because it is possible to define the pdf of prior-free assessment with good approximation
without reference to this error. Yet combinations of measurements cannot be studied if the quantisation
error is neglected. To prepare that study, we include now the quantisation error even in the analysis of a
single location measurement.
For simplicity, let us assume that the designer takes sufficient care so that digitisation does not
involve any error beside the quantisation error, or rather that such errors are negligible in comparison
with the principal “analog” error, E . The quantisation error remains for ever unknown (unless we
preserve and digitise again the same x) unlike the total error, e+r, which can be estimated to any desired
precision, with subsequent measurements.
Note that need for consideration of the quantisation error does not arise only in prior-free inference.
Without it, even the model problem of Bayesian inference with continuous sample space would be
impossible to solve because the probability of any real datum x is zero. Actually the likelihood of θ is
defined not for some datum x but for a range of x between y−P/2 and y+P/2. The usual underlying
assumption is that the assessment of P does not involve θ. It is not required that P be very small;
smallness of P only simplifies the calculations.
Though it is commonly assumed that if P is small enough then r is distributed approximately uni-
formly over its range, here we must examine why and in what sense this is valid.
We must clarify in what sense we assign probability density to r1 after the measurement. Typically
the quantisation error of a digitisation remains unknown, but for the sake of this argument now we shall
imagine that we measure it. Let us assume a second digitisation of the same analog quantity x1, with a
much smaller quantisation step, so that we can estimate r1. The “true” distribution of r1 is understood
in reference to an ensemble of iid measurements of the same parameter, each followed by the two
digitisations, the first of which happens to produce the same y1 (else it is excluded from this ensemble).
Thus specified, the distribution of r1 is defined in terms of the distribution of x1|B1,θ which is
f1(x1−θ), from Eq. 1. (That is, the distribution of r1 in [−P1/2,P1/2) corresponds to a normalised
slice of f1(x1−θ), with x1 between y1−P1/2 and y1+P1/2 – see Fig. 1.)
PrR1(r1|B1,θ,y1) ∝ f1(y1−r1−θ) . (10)
6Of course digitisation steps cannot be made arbitrarily small; on the contrary, in any set of measure-
ments, Pi are fixed, finite magnitudes. The limiting operation is intended to justify the approximation of
a true but unavailable pdf by a known density function.
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Figure 1: The result of a digitisation corresponds to an interval centered at y1, of width P1. The “true”
distribution of quantisation error r1 (imagining an ensemble of measurements starting with θ and ending
with y1) is ∝ f1(y1−r1−θ). Inasmuch as θ is unknown and not a r. v., this distribution is indefinite. Yet
in some sense it can be approximated by a rectangular distribution, regardless of θ, though at the cost of
excluding from the analysis all θ whose likelihood is smaller than some threshold.
However this definition alone cannot amount to any determinate pdf being assigned to r1, because the
true θ is unknown.7 Operative meaning is generated by the following considerations.
Approximating this unknown distribution by a rectangular one would be justified if we could prove
that, when P1 approaches 0, the distribution of r1/P1+1/2 (in [0,1)) converges uniformly to 1 for all
θ. Whether this is true depends on f1(·). Even in the case of a normal distribution the premise is not
true: considering any P1-wide slice of a normal distribution, the log of the ratio of left-to-right heights
is proportional to the distance from the mean; therefore it goes to ±∞ for θ →±∞.
With a normal f1(·), the only way to contrive this uniform convergence is by excluding from consid-
eration all θ whose likelihood ( f1(y1−θ)) is less than some arbitrary small threshold. With this provision
not only normal distributions but also any smooth f1(·) with bounded derivatives can be made to fulfil
the condition of uniform convergence. Detailed proof is rather straightforward. In this way we have
defined a provisional approximation of the post-measurement pdf of r1 by the rectangular distribution.
Perhaps a summary is helpful here. To advance our main undertaking, accurate combination of
location measurements without prior probability, we have seen the necessity of taking into account
quantisation errors. These errors are commonly associated approximately with rectangular distributions
if the step is small enough. Such association would be justified only if the true distribution converges
uniformly to the rectangular shape as P1 goes to 0. Yet for the post-measurement pdf of r1 this is not
true in general. To justify approximating this pdf by a rectangular distribution not only we assume a
small-enough P1 but also we provisionally exclude all θ whose likelihood is smaller than some arbitrary
threshold.
This provision amounts to setting an arbitrary high confidence level 1−ε to generate a (very wide)
confidence interval, or group of intervals, for θ, using likelihood to provide the requisite ordering. Then
the premise of uniform convergence is at the same confidence level. Under this provision, the quantisa-
7 If there is a prior for θ, we usually are not concerend with this true but elusive pdf because then θ
is a random sample from a population, so that we can fold the posterior pdf of Θ with f1(y1−r1−θ) to
produce the posterior pdf associated with r1, whether P1 is small or not. The approximation of this pdf
by a rectangular one for small P1 is warranted on the basis of smoothness and bounded derivatives.
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tion error corresponds approximately to a random variable R1 of rectangular pdf in [−P1/2,P1/2), as if
independent of E and without dependence upon θ.
The pre-measurement pdf of r1 is an average over all y1 (that is, 0, ±P, ±2P, ...) with reference to
θ:
PrR1(r1|B ,θ) = ∑y1 PrY1(y1|B1,θ)PrR1(r1|B1,θ,y1) = ∑y1 f1(y1−r1−θ) . (11)
It depends on θ in a periodic way, with period P1. Like the related post-measurement pdf, it cannot
be known exactly because θ is unknown and not a random variable. Uniform approximation by a
rectangular distribution can be derived from general assumptions of smoothness in combination with
Eq. 11, without need for any special provision.
In conclusion, in the limit of small P1, the quantisation error corresponds approximately to a random
variable R1 of rectangular distribution, the same before and after the measurement, if we impose on θ
some threshold (however small) of likelihood.
Since we have established some meaning for associating r1, approximately, with a random variable
R1 of rectangular distribution, now we may fold this pdf of R1 with Eq. 8 to provide approximate
meaning to “PrX(x|B1,M ,y1)”. Yet this would not be approximation of a defined if unknown pdf but
only taking advantage of approximations to define a density function that is not otherwise meaningful
(inasmuch as there is no prior for θ – see n. 7). Well defined predictive inference is provided by the true
though not exactly known PrX(x|B1,M ,y1,r1), approximated in Eq. 9.
Rather than being regrettable, the lack of such predictive inference that would be both accessible and
exactly defined is our way out of the inconsistency mentioned in Sec. 2.1.5. For that matter, uncertainty
is the very subject of probability calculus, so nothing is lost if it is combined with approximation.
The considerations outlined in Sec. 2.1.3 regarding the utility of the density function of prior-free
assessment – now f1(y1−θ) rather than f1(x1−θ) – have not been affected. This density function does
not express probability density of θ but if used in that sense it provides predictive inference, within
approximation depending on the size of the digitisation step.
3 Combining two location measurements
3.1 Statement of the problem
So far we have considered one completed location measurement in relation to a future generic measure-
ment. Now we consider two possibly different completed location measurements of the same parameter,
in relation to a future generic measurement. That is, the two errors
e1 ≡ x1−θ and e2 ≡ x2−θ
follow true pdfs independently of any other variable and of each other:
PrE1(e1|B1) = f1(e1) and PrE2(e2|B2) = f2(e2) .
Therefore, before the data become known, the joint pdf of the two errors is
PrE1,E2(e1,e2|{B i}) = f1(e1) f2(e2). (12)
When the two data x1 and x2 are taken into account, e1 and e2 are jointly constrained by the condi-
tion
e1− e2 = x1− x2 (13)
which defines a straight line l in the (e1,e2) plane, parametrized by θ:
e1 = x1−θ
e2 = x2−θ. (14)
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Therefore we need define relative probability for segments of this line. But such probability may be
defined only with reference to some limit, because joint probability vanishes for line segments.
However, if we compare two segments of l of equal length, chosen so that, at all points of the first
segment, the joint pdf is higher than at every point of the other segment, we intuitively perceive that the
probability of the first segment is higher than that of the second one. For an expanation why this is so,
we must take into account the errors generated in the digitisation of data.
3.2 Taking into account the quantisation errors
In terms of the digitised outcomes y i (i = 1,2) (these are the ones actually issued) Eq.s 14 become
e1 = y1− r1−θ
e2 = y2− r2−θ. (15)
By eliminating θ we obtain
e1− e2 = y1− y2 + r2− r1 (16)
instead of Eq. 13. Since each r i is constrained within [−Pi/2,Pi/2), the above equation defines a strip
in the (e1,e2) plane.
It will be convenient to transform the pair of random variables (E1,E2) into (E+,E−):
E+ ≡ (E1 +E2)/
√
2
E− ≡ (E2−E1)/
√
2 . (17)
This is equivalent to a pi/4 rotation of coordinate axes.
The related Jacobian determinant is 1, therefore the pre-measurement joint pdf of E+ and E− is
PrE+,E−(e+,e−|{B i}) = f1((e−−e+)/
√
2) f2((e−+e+)/
√
2) . (18)
A corresponding rotation of axes in the the (r1,r2) plane takes us from (r1,r2) to (r+,r−) (as in
Fig. 2):
r+ ≡ (r1 + r2)/
√
2
r− ≡ (r2− r1)/
√
2 . (19)
In terms of the new variables, Eq.s 15 become
e+ = (y2+y1)/
√
2−θ
√
2− r+ (20)
e− = (y2−y1)/
√
2− r− . (21)
We can form an argument similar to that in Sec. 2.1.6. First we must establish the pdf pertaining to
E+ after the measurement. This pdf will be conditioned not only by y1 and y2 but also by the unknown
r+; that is, PrE+(e+|{B i},{y i},r+). Each possible r+ corresponds to a certain range of possible values
for r−, say [r−,a,r−,b) (as marked on Fig. 2); from Eq. 21 we obtain a corresponding range of values for
e−; this range defines a strip in the (e+,e−) plane; the marginal pdf of e+ in this strip (extracted from
the joint pdf of Eq. 12) is the pdf of E+ with reference to y1, y2, and r+.
In defining this pdf we have not required that Pi be small but, since this assumption will be needed
soon, we simplify the equations by introducing it from the beginning. Therefore the strip in the plane
(e+,e−) will be reckoned as approximately of infinitesimal width, with e− ≈ 0. In the following equa-
tion the limiting operation regards an imagined sequence of pairs (P1,P2) going to (0,0) with a constant
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Figure 2: Quantisation errors of two measurements
or bounded ratio. The corresponding values r+, each in
[
−(P1+P2)/
(
2
√
2
)
,(P1+P2)/
(
2
√
2
))
,
make no difference in defining this limit:
lim PrE+(e+|{B i},{y i},r+) ∝ f1(
y2−y1
2
− e+√
2
) f2(y2−y12 +
e+√
2
) . (22)
which serves in approximating the pdf of e+ up to a normalisation constant.
Now we can formulate predictive inference regarding x, the datum of a future generic measurement,
which is modeled as in Eq. 3. For any tetrad of tentative values y1, y2, e+, and r+, using Eq. 20 we find
the corresponding value of the parameter,
θ = (y2+y1)/2− e+/
√
2− r+/
√
2 . (23)
In reference to the the tetrad y1, y2, e+, and r+ the future datum corresponds to a random variable:
PrX(x|{B i},{y i},e+,r+) = p
(
x;
(
(y2+y1)/2− e+/
√
2− r+/
√
2
))
. (24)
y1 and y2 are known; conditioned by r+, a pdf for e+ is defined and approximated in Eq. 22, assum-
ing that Pi are small. Therefore we define joint pdf of X and E+ conditioned by y1, y2, and r+, which
we express here in the limit of vanishing Pi,
lim PrX ,E+(x,e+|{B i},M ,{y i},r+)
∝ f1(y2−y12 −
e+√
2
) f2(y2−y12 +
e+√
2
) p(x;
y2+y1
2
− e+√
2
) . (25)
Predictive inference for X amounts to the marginal pdf of X ; in the limit of negligible Pi
lim PrX(x|{B i},M ,{y i},r+)
∝
∫
de+ f1(y2−y12 −
e+√
2
) f2(y2−y12 +
e+√
2
) p(x;
y2+y1
2
− e+√
2
) . (26)
In this limit there is no dependence upon r+.
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As in the case of a single location measurement, also from the combination of two location mea-
surements we have formulated predictive inference conditioned on a function of the digitisation errors
with the understanding that, whatever that magnitude happens to be, the corresponding true pdf of X
would not deviate to a large extent from the density in Eq. 26.
The same density function of X can be obtained if we pretend that in the future measurement the
parameter is a random variable with pdf f1(y1−θ) f2(y2−θ). So this density function represents our
prior-free assessment of θ based on the two location meassurements combined. It is the posterior arising
from a false prior uniform in θ.
In terms of the discussion in Sec. 3.1 (that is, disregarding the digitisation error) we have defined
probability density along line l, defined by Eq. 13 on the (E1,E2) plane, simply as proportional to the
pre-measurement joint pdf of E1 and E2.
4 Discussion
Location measurements of the same parameter are very easy to interpret intuitively, so that the arguments
in this work may be regarded as belabouring the obvious. The reason for the systematic treatment is
the need for preparing the concepts pertaining to the study of generic measurements, even counting
measurements, perhaps also involving more than one parameters. That development will be presented
in another work.
We have examined in detail combinations of only two location measurements of the same parameter.
Generalisation to any number N of such measurements is straightforward. After the measurements, the
N-dimensional error will be constrained close to a straight line by N−1 ancillary conditions similar
to Eq. 21. In analogy to variables E− and E+ of the two-measurement case, N new variables: E−1,
. . . E−(N−1), and E+ are introduced. In the same manner, r−1, . . . r−(N−1), r+ are defined. The result is, in
the approximation that assumes very small digitisation steps, that predictive inference is approximately
as if from a flat false prior.
Here is an idea for further research. The simplicity of the result, as expressed in the last paragraph of
Sec. 3.2, perhaps indicates the existence of a proof more general than the one presented in that section.
Such a proof would be advantageous if it could be generalised to address the combination of location
measurements regarding not the same parameter but functions of the same parameter. For example,
combining a measurement of a side of a cube with a measurement of the area of the cube and with a
measurement of the volume of the cube. After the measurements, the N-dimensional error is retricted
on a curve (if we disregard digitisation errors) parametrized by θ. An obvious conjecture is that the pdf
along this curve will be proportional to the pre-measurement N-dimensional joint pdf at the same point.
If we could prove it, then also Jeffreys’ prior would be shown to generate the same results.
5 Conclusions
Applying only the common postulates of probability, without any specific assumptions about statistical
inference, from single or combined location measurements of the same parameter we can obtain prior-
free predictive inference.
The same density function would be obtained if we started with a uniform prior for θ. Yet the
logical standing of that Bayesian posterior is distinct from prior-free assessment. Moreover, we have
not established either that in any generic situation predictive inference may be reduced to a presumptive
pdf for the parameter, or that such density function is the posterior from some false prior.
To be able to combine measurements, we must take into account the inevitable digitisation errors in
data recording, however small. In the absence of prior probability for the parameter, there are no exactly
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defined pdfs for such errors. Therefore we cannot just fold them into predictive inference; that is, the
true pdf of predictive inference is unknown but can be approximated by an available density function.
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